Algeria, Morocco and, earlier, Libya, developed diplomatic, military and covert measures, each with the goal of neutralising the other. The rivalries run deep, the goal being to take leadership of a Sahel region that is troubled and vulnerable, but at the same time offering great opportunities. All are agreed that building a "Greater Maghreb" is a regional necessity and is imperative in the context of globalisation and the proliferation of worldwide initiatives for integration.

Against a backdrop of crisis in the Western Sahara, Rabat is actively repositioning itself on the international and Sahelian scene, replacing Gadhafi, who had made leadership of the region his priority. The initiatives taken by King Mohamed VI with regard to the fight against climate change (COP 22) and the migratory routes between West Africa and Europe are two clear examples of this. Morocco is thus challenging Algerian hegemony on the southern border by highlighting the limits and contradictions of Algerian strategy in the fight against terrorism.

Algiers, in view of its history, the presence of Tuaregs on its territory and its ambitions, has also been developing a complex strategy for many years. Without denying the presence in the Sahel of a hard core of radical Islamists conveying a political and religious message, and resorting to terrorism and armed violence, a second key pointer, framed as a hypothesis, makes it possible to establish AQIM’s impact within the Maghreb and Sahel regions more clearly. Within the Algerian State are decision-making centres operating according to competing strategies, involved in an internal struggle for power and for control of national resources and illegal trafficking. The Arab revolutions marked a point of change and fuelled the fears of Algerian clans, leading them to develop delaying tactics intended to guarantee their survival. To the East, the Tunisian and Libyan revolutions; to the West, pressure from Morocco over the Saharan conflict; and to the South, the conflict in Mali, leading to increasing militarisation involving the Western powers. Finally, Algeria anticipates that its participation in exploring for and exploiting the energy sources of the Sahel might expose it to hostile strategies on the part of the Western powers. For all these reasons, Algeria sees itself as a citadel under siege.

At the same time, Libya established itself as a terrorist crucible, combined with a sanctuary for the commandos openly threatening the security of the Maghreb and the Sahel. After Operation Serval, the armed elements carrying out a tactical withdrawal regrouped in lawless southern Libya. The terrorist problem has merely been displaced, paving the way for a reshaping of the region over a long period of instability. In effect, the terrorist and mafia-type groups have support within the overwhelmed Libyan hierarchy, which struggles to assert its authority over the vast expanses of the South. The Libyan desert has been abandoned to chaos and to the rule of militias competing for control of the weapons and the trafficking.

Operation Serval also led to a diversion of drug trafficking from Latin America, now following a Nigeria-Niger-Libya route and avoiding heavily-monitored Mali. The future of Libya - close to the hotbeds of tension and vulnerability represented by the Darfur region, the Tubu area, the Islamist fundamentalism of Boko Haram and Egypt - is at the heart of the Sahel-Maghreb equation. In the event of a Jihadist revolt in Egypt, the Southwest of the country could form a new focus of instability extending from southern Libya towards Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Nigeria. Contagion is just a matter of time, as insecurity has now spread into the Chad-Nigeria region thanks to a favourable cross-border ethno-religious continuum. Niger is on alert. Finally, the collapse of the CAR and a new manipulation of religious differences between Christians and Muslims expanded the area of crisis and fuelled the sources of tension.